This is my response, specifically to a post by blogger Prudence Louise titled Why I’m not a Naturalist (also on Medium, which is what served it up to me) and generically to a host of similar effusions in the blogosphere.
There is a prologue, to which I will return, followed by four section headings in the form of assertions about things naturalism ‘can’t do’. The first of these is: “Naturalism can’t define the word natural.” This is a silly one. Prudence Louise obviously has in her mind a provisional definition of what naturalism entails, and she doesn’t like it.
The second and third headings read: “Naturalism can’t explain why the universe exists” and “Naturalism can’t explain why there are uniform and orderly laws of nature.” The fact that we are able to ask, and to some degree answer, “why” questions about matters of ordinary experience does not imply that any “why” question that we can state in words has an answer at all, let alone an answer that we can determine or prove. Supernaturalist worldviews can make handwaving assertions that purport to answer these questions, but there is no reason to take such claims seriously.
The final section heading declares: “Naturalism can’t explain the conscious dimensions of reality.” Many supernaturalist bloggers seem to consider this the knock-down argument. It is hard to see why. Anyone who doesn’t simply reject our knowledge about the brain must know that it is an organic information-processing system with a million million million synapses, and that the exact configuration and strength of these synapses changes over the lifetime of the brain, responding to the experiences of the world that the ‘owner’ of the brain undergoes. The supernaturalists claim to know that this system cannot possibly be responsible for the ‘conscious dimensions of reality’, but how can they know this? How does the evolution-formed ability to make judgments about everyday matters confer an ability to have correct intuitions about a enormously complex grey-box system like the brain?
We should also ask those who use this line of argument, What would count as an ‘explanation’? How could any explanation tell the whole story, a story that would account not only for why my synapses are arranged the way they are, but that would answer this question for everyone? (And, of course, an appeal to an immaterial, immortal [why immortal?] soul is not an explanation in any sense.)
The second paragraph of Prudence Louise’s prologue is revealing. She writes: “The naturalist story says that as scientific knowledge advances, it’s proving beyond reasonable doubt there is no God, no eternal soul, no afterlife, and we live in an insentient and purposeless universe.” Well, I am a naturalist in her general sense, but I would never make such an assertion. What I would say, however, is that I see no reason to include in my worldview any role for a god, or an eternal soul, or an afterlife. Anyboy who thinks they can give me such a reason is encouraged to make the attempt.